Tragedy to Truth: Hillsborough Health & Safety
Inquests into the Hillsborough disaster of 1989 have been concluded by the Jury that the 96 football fans who were fatally injured were killed unlawfully.
Families of victims were all seen hugging and punching the air in celebration and relief at the news of the recent inquest. It was an emotional moment for many.
For 27 years, the burden of blame for the incidents that unfolded at the FA Cup semi-final was lifted.
Families and campaigners now had proof as to why the disaster happened and how corners were cut which, if addressed, could have prevented the death of 96 men, women, and children.
Key errors of 1989
After years of blaming fans and years of constant inquests, it has finally been decided and agreed upon that the emergency services and authoritative figures in charge of the match are being held responsible for the Hillsborough disaster due to breaches of Health & Safety.
A number of main mistakes have been raised by the court which they suggest would have prevented the disaster.
- Failure to prevent crowd congestion
- Not closing the tunnel
- Not delaying kick-off
- Slow emergency response
- Lessons not learned
Failure to prevent crowd congestion
The inquest jury blamed the Police failures before and on the day of the tragedy.
There were no contingency plans in place for the sudden arrival of a large number of fans and perimeter gates were not closed soon enough to prevent the overcrowding of turnstiles. This is where control was lost by the authorities. As congestion grew and with Liverpool supporters still outside the stadium, Duckingfield, chief superintendent in charge of the match refused to delay kick-off, so, to speed the process up, opened back gate ‘C’ allowing the remaining fans to charge through.
Not closing the tunnel
By leaving this gate open for a duration of five minutes, it wasn’t just ticket-holders that were free to enter- due to the surge of people eagerly wanting to get a good view of the pitch, pens 3 and 4 were gathering serious crowds at the back intensifying the crush at the front of the pen against the 6 ft fence. If the tunnel to the pens had been closed off, fans would have been diverted to emptier pens on either side.
Not delaying kick-off
It was only until fans started climbing over the pen barriers onto the pitch that police realized a disaster was unfolding. Under questioning, Mr. Duckingfield agreed that he had the power to delay kick-off and should have done so in the interests of crowd safety.
Slow emergency response
When emergency services were informed, the response was described as ‘woefully inadequate’. The Senior Ambulance Officer at the time accepted that he failed to look into the pens themselves so he had no idea people were being crushed. He agreed that he ‘failed to properly assess the situation.’ Only two ambulances arrived during the horror. Out of the 96 fatalities, only 14 of them went to the hospital.
The deaths were originally ruled accidental, but following the Hillsborough Independent Panel report of 2012, these verdicts were quashed and new hearings ordered.
New inquests found the direct medical causes of death in all but three of the victims, was compression asphyxia proving the pens at Hillsborough were so overcrowded, Liverpool fans were crushed to death.
Lessons not learned
Graham Mackrell, former club secretary at Sheffield Wednesday and the man responsible for the safety at the stadium, admitted that safety conditions were breached during Liverpool’s FA Cup semi-final, including keeping a record of how many spectators were admitted. Mr. Mackrell said, at the time, he did not see any problems with what was in place. But the jury announced that there was an error in the safety certification for Hillsborough stadium.
The jury has
also heard that Sheffield council’s environmental health officer, Paul Jackson, ‘may have written’ a report in 1988 refusing a safety certificate for the football grounds. The jury was shown a fire service report also written in 1988, recommending the stadium be ‘shut down’ for breaches of fire safety regulations.
Mr. Mackrell however, said he was unaware of this information.
Mr. Jackson reported to the jury that he visited the stadium later that evening on the day of the disaster, where he noticed the spacing between barriers at Leppings Lane Terrace (the entrance for all Liverpool fans) was not compliant with the Green Guide to stadium safety.
On discovery of these critical features, Mr. Jackson arranged for the HSE to begin an investigation into the Hillsborough disaster.
On inspection it was clear that the stadium was not suitable for that amount of people as the capacity calculations and density packing tests prove;
“7.6. – The estimated total for Pen 3 of 1576 is about 55% greater than the value calculated from a packing density of 5.4 people per square metre.”
After admitting he ordered for Gate C to be opened to allow the crowds in, for kick off to start, it put to bed his previous claims, that supporters had charged the gates and killed their own.
Now comes the criminal investigation – ‘Operation Resolve’ which the Independent Police Complaints Commission will conclude a year from now.
27 years down the line, it’s refreshing to know that justice has prevailed, but it’s bad news for those who are being held accountable for the disaster after so long.
The Health & Safety regulations were overlooked in 1989, and despite guidelines being in place at the time, authorities breached their duty of care to the public by not ensuring that the stadium had proper safety measures in place.
Chief Constable David Crompton said that the police ‘unequivocally accept’ the findings and at the time the force ‘got the policing catastrophically wrong.’
The message to everyone here is that health & safety is number one priority. One small corner cut will have a huge impact.
“You will never walk alone!”
Sources:
Explore our Access Digital Learning and Compliance software
